3478e7b913
Coder ships `coder exp mcp server` and omp is an MCP client, so the two compose with no custom code. The agent stays on the host where its credentials already live and reaches into the workspace, rather than shipping secrets into a container. - scripts/coder-mcp.sh wraps the server, passing a dedicated `omp-mcp` token via `docker exec --env-file` (mode 600 temp file, shredded by an EXIT trap) so the token never appears in argv or ps - allow-list exposes 26 of 32 tools; template mutation is excluded because pushing a template is the one real path from a Coder principal to the host docker socket - scripts/coder-token-rotate.sh handles the 168h token lifetime cap: mint, verify against the API, then revoke the predecessors - .omp/mcp.json registers it project-scoped so 26 tools do not load into every unrelated omp session The docker exec must stay in the foreground: backgrounding it makes bash redirect stdin from /dev/null with job control disabled, and the MCP transport dies on EOF with "MCP tool load failed ... Transport closed". Verified: fresh omp session in this directory answered from the tools - coder_get_authenticated_user returned loca, workspace ws1 running.
67 lines
3.1 KiB
Bash
Executable File
67 lines
3.1 KiB
Bash
Executable File
#!/usr/bin/env bash
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# Coder MCP server, wrapped for the omp harness.
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#
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# Speaks MCP over stdio, so it is spawned as a child process by an MCP client
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# (omp registers it in .omp/mcp.json). It gives the agent Coder's own tool set:
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# workspace lifecycle, in-workspace bash/file operations, task management and
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# read-only template inspection.
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#
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# Credential handling: the token is written to a mode-600 temp file and handed
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# to `docker exec --env-file`, never passed as an argument. That keeps it out of
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# argv, out of `ps`, and out of any agent transcript. The file is removed when
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# this script exits.
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#
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# The token is a dedicated, revocable Coder token named `omp-mcp`, not the
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# operator session token. Rotate with:
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# scripts/coder-token-rotate.sh
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# List/revoke with:
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# sudo -n docker exec coder /opt/coder tokens list
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# sudo -n docker exec coder /opt/coder tokens remove <id>
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set -euo pipefail
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TOKEN_FILE="/home/loca/dev/coder/.mcp-token"
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CRED="/home/loca/dev/coder/.admin-credentials"
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CONTAINER="coder"
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[[ -r "$TOKEN_FILE" ]] || { echo "missing token file: $TOKEN_FILE" >&2; exit 1; }
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[[ -r "$CRED" ]] || { echo "missing credentials file: $CRED" >&2; exit 1; }
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url="$(sed -n 's/^url=//p' "$CRED")"
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[[ -n "$url" ]] || { echo "no url= line in $CRED" >&2; exit 1; }
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ENVF="$(mktemp)"
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chmod 600 "$ENVF"
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trap 'rm -f "$ENVF"' EXIT
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{
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printf 'CODER_URL=%s\n' "$url"
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printf 'CODER_SESSION_TOKEN=%s\n' "$(tr -d '[:space:]' <"$TOKEN_FILE")"
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} >"$ENVF"
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# Tool allow-list. Template mutation is deliberately excluded: pushing a
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# template is the one identified path from a Coder principal to the host docker
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# socket, so the agent gets read-only template access and full workspace access.
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# Excluded on purpose: coder_create_template, coder_create_template_version,
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# coder_update_template_active_version, coder_delete_template,
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# coder_delete_task, coder_upload_tar_file.
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ALLOWED="coder_get_authenticated_user,\
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coder_list_workspaces,coder_get_workspace,coder_create_workspace,coder_create_workspace_build,\
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coder_workspace_bash,coder_workspace_ls,coder_workspace_read_file,coder_workspace_write_file,\
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coder_workspace_edit_file,coder_workspace_edit_files,coder_workspace_list_apps,\
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coder_workspace_port_forward,coder_get_workspace_agent_logs,coder_get_workspace_build_logs,\
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coder_list_templates,coder_get_template,coder_template_version_parameters,\
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coder_get_template_version_logs,\
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coder_create_task,coder_list_tasks,coder_get_task_status,coder_get_task_logs,\
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coder_send_task_input,\
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search,fetch"
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# Foreground on purpose. Backgrounding this (`&` + `wait`) breaks the server:
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# with job control disabled, bash redirects an async command's stdin from
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# /dev/null, so the MCP stdio transport sees EOF immediately and the client
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# reports "MCP tool load failed: Transport closed". Running in the foreground
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# keeps the client's stdin pipe attached; the child shares this process group,
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# so group-directed signals reach it directly, and the EXIT trap still shreds
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# the env file once it exits (including on stdin close).
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sudo -n docker exec -i --env-file "$ENVF" "$CONTAINER" \
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/opt/coder exp mcp server --allowed-tools "$ALLOWED"
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