coder: autostop TTL, nightly backups, Authelia OIDC, wildcard runbook
- docker-compose: CODER_OIDC_* wired to Authelia (password login kept as break-glass) - scripts/backup-stacks.sh + stacks-backup.timer: nightly pg_dump, Continue state, stack configs - vault: verification items 13/14, auth-model OIDC section, limits DNS-01 runbook
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Antigravity
@@ -60,19 +60,43 @@ reviewed: 2026-08-20
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- there is no self-service registration in Coder OSS with password auth; a user appears only because an admin made it
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- password reset for the initial Owner is a host-side operation: `coder reset-password <username>` only works when run on the machine running the control plane, which here means inside the `coder` container
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## 🔭 Future upgrade path: Authelia as an OIDC provider
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## 🔗 Authelia as OIDC provider — configured
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Not implemented, and it requires operator approval because it means editing the shared Authelia deployment.
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Implemented 2026-08-20. Identity is unified at the application layer: Coder consumes Authelia over OIDC. The proxy is still ungated — everything in the sections above still holds, and adding an `auth_request` gate would still break agents.
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- shape of the change:
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- register a new OIDC client in Authelia for Coder, with redirect URI `https://code.loca.zone/api/v2/users/oidc/callback`
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- set `CODER_OIDC_ISSUER_URL`, `CODER_OIDC_CLIENT_ID`, `CODER_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET` and, if wanted, `CODER_OIDC_EMAIL_DOMAIN` on the `coder` service
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- optionally add `offline_access` to `CODER_OIDC_SCOPES` so sessions survive access-token expiry
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- optionally set `CODER_DISABLE_PASSWORD_AUTH=true` once OIDC login is proven
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- what it does and does not change:
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- it unifies identity inside Coder, at the application layer, where the CLI and agents keep using their bearer tokens
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- it does not, and must not, add an nginx `auth_request` gate; the failure modes above still apply
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- prerequisites the operator must approve: a new Authelia client definition, a client secret placed in `.env`, and a restart of both stacks
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Authelia side, `/home/loca/dev/services/authelia/config/configuration.yml`, second entry under `identity_providers.oidc.clients`:
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- `client_id: 'coder'`, `client_name: 'Coder'`, `public: false`
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- `client_secret` is a `pbkdf2-sha512` digest read via `{{ secret "/config/secrets/oidc/coder-client-secret.digest" }}`; that file is `600 root:root`, and the container runs as root so the strict mode is safe
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- `authorization_policy: 'one_factor'`, `consent_mode: 'implicit'`, `token_endpoint_auth_method: 'client_secret_basic'`
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- single redirect URI `https://code.loca.zone/api/v2/users/oidc/callback`
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- scopes `openid`, `profile`, `email`, `groups`; grant `authorization_code`; response type `code`
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Coder side, `environment:` on the `coder` service in `docker-compose.yml`:
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| variable | value |
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|---|---|
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| `CODER_OIDC_ISSUER_URL` | `https://auth.loca.zone` |
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| `CODER_OIDC_CLIENT_ID` | `coder` |
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| `CODER_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET` | `${CODER_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET}`, interpolated from `.env` (mode 600, gitignored) |
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| `CODER_OIDC_SCOPES` | `openid,profile,email` |
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| `CODER_OIDC_SIGN_IN_TEXT` | `Sign in with loca.zone SSO` |
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Deliberately unset:
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- `CODER_DISABLE_PASSWORD_AUTH` — password login stays as break-glass. If Authelia or the OIDC client breaks, the Owner can still log in with the credential in `.admin-credentials`
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- `CODER_OIDC_EMAIL_DOMAIN` — no domain restriction; the Authelia user database is the gate
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Agent and CLI traffic is unaffected: both authenticate with `Coder-Session-Token` bearer tokens against `/api/v2/...`, a path OIDC never touches. Verified after the change — `ws1` agent `main` still `connected`, token `GET /api/v2/users/me` still `200`.
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Verification actually performed:
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- `GET /api/v2/users/authmethods` returns `password.enabled: true` and `oidc.enabled: true` with `signInText: "Sign in with loca.zone SSO"`
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- `https://code.loca.zone/login` renders the SSO button next to the password form
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- clicking it produces the chain `/api/v2/users/oidc/callback?redirect=%2F` → `https://auth.loca.zone/api/oidc/authorization?...client_id=coder...redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fcode.loca.zone%2Fapi%2Fv2%2Fusers%2Foidc%2Fcallback&response_type=code&scope=openid+profile+email` with PKCE `S256` → the Authelia login form at `?flow=openid_connect`. Authelia raising the form rather than `invalid_client` is the proof that the client id and secret digest are accepted
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- the final credential entry at the Authelia form is the operator's own SSO login and was not performed here: `users_database.yml` stores only a password hash, so no automated agent can complete it. First interactive SSO login remains an operator action, and it will create a second Coder account unless the OIDC email matches `admin@loca.zone`
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Rotation: regenerate with `authelia crypto hash generate pbkdf2 --variant sha512 --random --random.length 64 --random.charset alphanumeric`, install the `Digest` to the digest file, put the `Random Password` in `.env`, then `docker compose restart` Authelia and `docker compose up -d --force-recreate coder`.
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## 📚 Sources
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@@ -135,6 +135,35 @@ ss -ltn
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- any dev server started from a workspace or an IDE terminal must avoid every port in the AGENTS.md registry; `52222` pwiz, `52223` reserved for pwiz, `52224` cdsr and `52226` code are taken
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- loca.zone application backends bind loopback inside `51000-53000`
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## 1️⃣3️⃣ Autostop TTL is armed
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```bash
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TOKEN=$(sed -n 's/^session_token=//p' /home/loca/dev/coder/.admin-credentials)
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curl -s -H "Coder-Session-Token: $TOKEN" http://127.0.0.1:52226/api/v2/templates \
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| python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(t['name'], t['default_ttl_ms'], t['activity_bump_ms']) for t in json.load(sys.stdin)]"
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curl -s -H "Coder-Session-Token: $TOKEN" http://127.0.0.1:52226/api/v2/users/loca/workspace/ws1 \
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| python3 -c "import json,sys; w=json.load(sys.stdin); print(w['ttl_ms'], w['latest_build']['deadline'])"
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```
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- expect template `docker` at `28800000` default TTL (8h) and `3600000` activity bump (1h)
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- expect `ws1` `ttl_ms` `28800000` and a non-null `deadline` roughly 8h ahead
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- a `deadline` of `None` on a running workspace means that build predates the TTL: the schedule only attaches at build time, so `coder restart ws1 -y` is required once. `coder schedule extend` refuses with `Workspace shutdown is manual.` in that state
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- the subcommand is `coder schedule stop <ws> 8h`; there is no `override-stop` in v2.35.3
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## 1️⃣4️⃣ Nightly backup timer
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```bash
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systemctl list-timers stacks-backup --no-pager
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sudo -n systemctl start stacks-backup.service
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D=/home/loca/backups/stacks/$(date +%F)
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sudo -n gunzip -t $D/coder-db.sql.gz && sudo -n ls -l $D
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```
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- expect the timer `active` with a next elapse at 04:30 local, `Persistent=true` so a missed run catches up after downtime
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- expect three non-empty artifacts in the dated directory: `coder-db.sql.gz` (`pg_dump` of the Coder control plane), `continue-config.tgz` (`/home/loca/.continue`, which lives outside both projects), `stack-configs.tgz` (both stacks' config, deploy, scripts and templates)
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- artifacts are root-owned; retention keeps 14 dated directories
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- `.env`, `.admin-credentials` and `.ai-credentials` are deliberately excluded — they are keys, not data; verify with `sudo -n tar tzf $D/stack-configs.tgz | grep -c credentials` returning `0`
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## 🧹 Pre-publish wiki lint gate
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Run this before every `build.sh` invocation, so before item 7 above. It is a gate, not a smoke test: it exits non-zero and publishes nothing.
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